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Prosecuting the Press for Publishing Classified
Information
Geoffrey R. Stone
For more than 215 years the United States has flourished in the absence of any federal legislation directly prohibiting the press from publishing government secrets. The absence of such legislation is no accident. It
clearly fulfills the promise of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make
no law.., abridging the freedom... of the press."
Of course, the First Amendment is not an absolute. The press may be
held accountable for publishing libel, obscenity, false advertising, and the
like. As the Supreme Court observed more than sixty years ago, "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Government secrets are something else entirely. There is nothing
about matters labeled "government secrets" that inherently makes their dissemination "no essential part of any exposition of ideas" and of only "slight
value as a step to truth." To the contrary, the publication of such information may be extraordinarily valuable to the proper functioning of a selfgoverning society. The very notion of punishing the press for publishing
information because the government wants to keep that information secret
runs counter to the most fundamental tenets of public accountability.
Of course, there are secrets and there are secrets. It may be helpful to
distinguish three different types of secrets. First, there are what we might
call "illegitimate" government secrets. What renders such secrets "illegitimate" is that their secrecy does not in any way further the public good.
They are secret because someone in government is attempting to hide an
embarrassing or damning truth from public scrutiny. We know from both
human nature and common experience that government officials may sometimes try to shield from public view their misjudgments, incompetence,
venality, cupidity, and corruption. To protect their own interests, such officials may assert that secrecy is essential to the national security. Needless
to say, this is illegitimate in a self-governing society. It is vital in a constitutional democracy that such deception must be ferreted out and exposed.
Second, there are what we might call "legitimate but newsworthy"
government secrets. The disclosure of some government secrets might
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harm our national security, and the government certainly has a legitimate
interest in preventing such harm. But the public disclosure of such secrets
may also have salutary and substantial "value as a step to truth." Indeed,
this is often the case. For example, the publication of secret information
that Army rifles routinely malfunction might be both harmful and beneficial
to the national interest. That this publication might harm the national interest from one perspective does not preclude it from serving the national interest from another. Similarly, the publication of information that the security around our nuclear power plants is inadequate both threatens and serves
the national interest. In such situations, which are quite common, it is often
difficult to know with any confidence which effect predominates.
Third, there are what we might call "legitimate and non-newsworthy"
government secrets. The public disclosure of such secrets might harm the
national security but have only "slight value as a step to truth." An example
would be public disclosure that the government has broken the enemy's
code, where the disclosure serves no legitimate public interest. Of course,
whether any particular disclosure actually furthers a legitimate public interest is often a matter of dispute, so it may be easier to define this category in
the abstract than to apply it in practice.
A central challenge to a free society is to distinguish among these three
types of secrets. In principle, the government should never be able to punish the publication of "illegitimate" secrets and should be able to punish the
publication of "legitimate and non-newsworthy" secrets. The middle category, which is no doubt the largest, is also the most difficult to assess in
terms of striking the proper balance. Moreover, this taxonomy is easier to
state than to implement. When it comes to distinguishing among these
three types of secrets in the real world, particularly in the context of criminal prosecutions of the press, the problems of complexity and vagueness
can be overwhelming.
To provide reasonable guidance to the press, avoid chilling the publication of information that is important to the public interest, and limit the
dangers of unchecked prosecutorial discretion, we need clear, simple rules.
Such rules, by definition, will be imperfect. They will inevitably protect
either too much or too little expression; they will inevitably protect either
too much or too little secrecy. This is a dilemma.
This brings me back to the lessons of history. As I noted earlier, for
more than 215 years the United States has resolved this dilemma by not
prohibiting the press from publishing government secrets. Perhaps even
more important, there has not been a single instance in the history of the
United States in which the press's publication of a "legitimate but newsworthy" government secret has gravely harmed the national interest. The lesson of this experience is that the best course for the United States is to refrain from prohibiting the press to publish "legitimate but newsworthy"
government secrets. Although one can imagine hypotheticals in which such
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a publication could seriously harm the national interest, more than two centuries of experience has proved that the threat of such prosecutions is unnecessary, and would do more harm than good.
For the government to wield the power to prosecute the press for such
publications would give government officials enormous capacity to intimidate and threaten the press and thereby undermine its vital role in our democratic system. To grant government officials such authority would seriously jeopardize the ability and willingness of the press to expose to public
scrutiny what should be exposed.
I return now to my third category of government secrets - those that
are "legitimate and non-newsworthy." The publication of these secrets
could harm the national interest without contributing to informed public
debate. Thus, in principle, the government should be able to prohibit the
public disclosure of such secrets. The problem, though, is that it is not easy
even to "know such secrets when we see them." The very concept of "nonnewsworthy" is elusive. Although that is a genuine difficulty, it is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle. It should be possible reasonably to
limit the uncertainty by clearly and narrowly defining precisely what is
prohibited.
It may be useful in this regard to work backwards from the paradigm
example of the government secret that should not be published. Suppose a
newspaper publishes the fact that the United States has broken the al Qaeda
code, and as a consequence the terrorists change their cipher. Suppose also
that there is no legitimate public interest in the publication of this information. That is, the publication does not reveal any possible illegality, incompetence, venality, or misjudgment by government officials.
This example embodies two factors that might help define the scope of
a constitutionally permissible criminal prohibition. First, the newspaper
knew or was reckless in not knowing that the publication of this information would create a clear and imminent danger of a grave harm to the national security. Second, the newspaper knew or was reckless in not knowing that the publication of this information was "non-newsworthy."
With these two elements in place, it might be possible to enact a carefully crafted law that addresses the most serious dangers to the national
security, while at the same time protecting the freedom of the press and the
compelling national interest in free and robust debate and discussion of
matters of legitimate public concern.
But would it be good public policy to enact such a law? On balance, I
think not. Once again, I return to the lessons of history. Even if such a law
would be constitutional, I doubt it would be either necessary or wise. In
215 years of experience, the problem has never actually arisen. And even if
some might, disagree with that assessment, the number of instances about
which there might be disagreement can easily be counted on one hand.
This would be a law in search of a problem. This is never a sound basis for
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legislation and certainly not in dealing with a freedom as precious as the
freedom of the press. I remain convinced that the Congress had it right in
1917. Even a law drawn this narrowly would cause more mischief than it is
worth. Some things are simply best left alone.
I do not in any way mean to suggest that the government has no legitimate interest in keeping military secrets. Certainly, it does. But the way
to protect this interest is not by threatening to prosecute the press. It is,
rather, by preserving the confidentiality of the information by implementing
effective (and constitutionally permissible) regulations governing public
employees who unlawfully leak such information. As the Yale constitutional scholar Alexander Bickel once observed, this is surely a "disorderly
situation," but it may be the best we can do. If we give the government too
much power to punish the press, we risk too great a sacrifice of public debate; if we give the government too little power to control secrecy "at the
source," we risk too great a sacrifice of essential secrecy. The American
solution has been to reconcile the irreconcilable values of secrecy and freedom by protecting an expansive right of the press to publish and a strong
power of the government to prohibit leaks. The American solution may be
unruly, but it has served the nation well.
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